INTRODUCTION
In the March 1966 issue of this journal, Professor Keith B. Griffin identifies and discusse-a number of crucially important factors bearing upon the uneven character of Latin America's economic, social, 1 and political development.
The Western world economic system of "mercantile capitalism," as he terms it, has resulted ii the gains from economic progress being "uaequally" and "inequitably" distributed both among nations and within nations.
The apparently substantial rates of development in Latin America frequently reflect an expansicn of exports of primary products with the gains going largely to foreign interests. Within Latin America, poorly operating labor and capital markets and defective price systems functioning in an environment of intense class struggle have led to an inequitable distribution of national income with the lower class, rural masses especially suffering. The ability of the wealthy landlord to "exploit" his laborers, the desire of the rising middle classes to imitate the behavior of upper classes, and the tendency for major political parties to cater to the "organized and privileged elites" have combined to systematically deprive the lower classes of the fruits of economic progress.
In view of the importance of the topics Professor Griffin discusses, it i±-especially unfortunate that his treatment is marred by a number of notions anJ conclusions that leave the reader with an unnecessarily distorted view of Latin American development. The situation is all the more disquieting because many of tha threads of analysis in his paper serve to perpetuate and support questionable views repeatedly voiced by other writers who enjoy a wide and sympathetic audience, especially in Latin America itself.
Rather than to offer a point-by-point critique of Professor Griffin's analysis, which would be too lengthy for presentation here, I shall concentrate on three major aspects with which he is concerned:
I) Sources of past geowth particularly with respect to the role of foreign iav.vestment, 2) The distribution of income as a reflection cf class conflict, and 3) Alternative possibilities for reform. Hopefully this effort will contcibute in some ways to setting the record straight and proviLde a clearer notion of the problems and prospects of developmetit in Latin America.
II. SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
In evaluating Latin America's present position and future prospects, sources of past growth are of major relevance. As shown in Table 1 , Latin American growth rates (in terms of recorded per capita increases in GNP) for the region as a whole have been positive in recent years, though they have fallen below those recorded for must other areas of the world. Questions immediate!y arise about the meiningfilness of this growth experience, and the extent to which sources of past growth can be relied upon for continued progress.
THE ROLE OF fOREIGN ENTERPRISE
Many observers have complained that Latin America has been too dependent for growth on the export of primary products. Not only are these goods subject to wide fluctuations in world demands btit, so it is frequently alleged, foreign investors heavily involved in many of these accivities reap much of the benefit at the expense of Latin America. As a case in point, Professor Griffin contends Table 1 GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: ESTIMATED ANYNAL GROWTzH KATES, 1957 -1958 AVERAGE TO 1953 -1964 Where growth has occurred it frequently has been due to a rapid expansion of fo-eign demand for pritrary exports, e.g., petroleum and iron ore in Venezut.!a, and the lion's share of the benefits has been captured by foreign interests." (p. 2)
Aside from the ambiguity of the concept of "illusory growth" this statement raises issues about the distribution of benefits between host countries and foreign investors, and the special probleias associAted with dependence on primary goods exports, to which we shall now turn.
Evidence bearing upon the distribution of benefits between foreign-owned firms and host countries is spotty and far from complete, but what little I have seen does not lend support to the idea that foreign fiti-s have gotten the "lion's share" (however we would define such a nebulou-, term). Table 2 reproduces data oubiai1.d 11., U U.S.
Department of Comne.:ce study made some years ago. If, as a very rough cut, we regard neL income after taxes as reflecting total net bencfiLs to the firms, and l~oal taxes as reflecting tOL1l net benefits to the host countries, the total tax receipts of $1098 million and net income of $b97 million, would suggest thlat the count€L':=.
received about 60 per cent of the total benefit. In the case of petroleum in Venezuela --specifically mentioned by Professor Griffin --tax revenues were $428 million compared with $409 million in net iaicome.
Of course, an adequate evaluation of benefits involves much more than simply looking at net income and local taxes. As a second approximation, one would also want to take explicitiy into account thr-oppcrtunitY costs of foreign and local resources (labor, materials, plant: and equipment, etc.) required for production. Net incore figures mentioned above exaggerate the net benefits to the firms to the extent that these returns must cover interest on the investment and other components of "normal" profits. Thus, net benefit, measured by "excess" profits, would constitute some fraction of the profit figures noted above.
Ilbid., pp. 128, 188. Interest, royalties, and dividends "/6
Income taxes 687
Other taxes 411
Ot~hr and unspecified 392
Total local payments 4.314
Net income 697
Source:
U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Investments in the Latin Aknarican Economy, pp. 117, 124.
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With respect to local resources, prices paid by the firms probabl reflcct quite poorly the opportunity costE to the host economy. e
On balance, it is probably reasonable to assume that opportunity coslffall somewhat below the costs to Lhe foreign firms --co the extent that resources employed by these firms would otherwise be unemploye!d or employed in less socially valued purFu its, the economy enjoys a an additional net positive beriefit.
Taking into account local opportunity costs together with foreig t costs, the relative share of benefits going to host countries is eve, greater that the figures mentioned earlier.
On one hand the net profit figure in Table 2 overestimates the net benefits to the firms.
On the other, net benefits to coaintries exceed the value of tax revenr.
Again, the analysis provides little comfort to those who contend th.t "foreign interests" get the "lion's share."
To go a step further, foreign investments affect host economies, If new local wars break out, demand for many primary products will be strong; if the advanced countries suffer recession, demand will fall; if consumer tastes shift toward or away from products with a hi ,h primary content, demand for affected goods will vary accordingly; if major technical breakthro!.,ghs are made in fuel-cell electrical power, the demand for petroleum will likely fall; if technical changes take place to permit a higher level of substitution 1 Also, in the case of Chilean copper, future prices will depend on the level of competing production in Zambia which in turn will de~pend on far more than purely economic considerations, i.e., the course of relations with Rhodesia.
• ]of aluminum for copper, they would work to the disadvantage of Chile and Peru, but would improve the prospects for Jamaica, Surinam, and Guyana. Finally, if exporters of particular primary products succeec in establishing and enforcing agreements to restrict output and raise prices, they will do better than would otherwise be the case.
In short, I would suggest that uncertaint_ with respect to future foreign exchange earnings, and the attendant short-term sharp fluct.
ations in receipts, is a problem that merits much more concern than the prospects, posed by some analybts, that long-run trends will be unfavorable.
2. In the past there has been a tendency to treat the lessdeveloped world vis-a-vis the advanced world as if each of the two were somehow economic monoliths, where one unambiguously gains and the other unambiguously loses depending on the set of postulated circumstances.
Less-developed countries are, of course, not a homogenous lot, and many changes (such as the aluminum-copper substituti, noted above) can generate both losses and gains within the group.
In this sense, to talk about long-run trends for "Latin American"
exports can be misleading insofar as it ignores the intraregional distribution of benefits. As Habeler has observed:
"Considering for a moment Latin American countries only, it would be a strange coincidence indeed if, in the long run, the commodity terms of trade, let alone the factoral terms of trademoved parallel for coffee countries, mining countries, petroleum exporters, and exporters of wheat, wool, and fats. The same holds of the other side of the fence. The dissimilarity of the trade structure of developed countries is hardly less pronounced than that of underdeveloped countries." 1 for biasing the process of development away from them.
MANUFACTURING AS A SOURCE OF GROWTH
Professor Griffin notes that che manufacturing sector also has been a major source of pest growth. Howeer, he is pessimistic about the future because '"uch of the industrialIzation ... has not been primarily due/to the initiative of native entrepreneurs."
Rather, it has been largely due to foreign i! ,esonent, and government enterprise, while domestic-private interests have been usually confined to "small consumer goods industries" or to "satellite factories" of the foreign and government-managed enterprises. He further contends that "even these private manufacturing investments were frequently undertaken by immigrants, who no longer are attracted to the region in large 1 Reading the vast literature on integration, one has the uncomfortable feeling that many writers entertain grossly exaggerated expectations of the benefits that will accrue from integration.
Granted that integration would be a move in the right direction, by itself it will surely leave many problems untouched. 2An interesting discussion of this possibility is contained in H. G. Johnson, "Tar4ffs and Economic Development," The Journal of Development Studies, October 1964, pp. 22-24.
THI: ROLE OF SERVICES
Rapid expansion of the services sector is another source of growth of GNP. However, according to Professor Griffin. expansion in this sector "is a mere reflection" of rapid population growth, the lack of employment opportunities in agriculture, and migration from "rural areas to urban slums." Oi this bais he moves to the remarkable statement that the growth of the services seccor "represents virtually no increase in economic welfare" and goes on to contend that "apparent increases (his italics) in the services sector should be ignored completely in calculating the rate of growth of natlooal
What sense can be made of such a statement is elusive. Granted that there is lots of underemployment in urbarn areas, it is still true, I should hope, that whatever remunerative services people are able to perform (at however low a wage) would represent a higher level of welfare than would be the case in the absence of these services.
Perhaps the implication to be drawn is that these people would have been better off remaining in rural areas; yet Professor Griffin goes to considerable length in discussing the "deplorable"
conditions of the rural masses. The fact that so much migration takes place from rural to urban areas !.s prima facie evidence that migrants believe they are better in urban areas, though in absolute terms, of course, they stwy still remain quite badly off.
In concluding this section, I would like to go a step further and mention briefly one factor not treated by Professor Griffin that can contribute to "illusory growth" (to borrow his phrase): The process of urbanization itself brings about a rise in consumntion of goods and services traded in the market as a substitute for selfuse productive activities in rural areas that tend not to get counted in income statistics. Thus as Professor Nove has observed with respect to th*! Soviet Union:
"Fcr instance there was a spectacular growth in the number of bakeries, meat processing plant and much eise besides, reflecting neither increased w?.fare nor increased consumption of these comnnodities, but simply urbanization ... all backward peasant countries experience the same thing when they industrialize. The relevant thing to bear in mind is that this factor has tended to expand measurable industrial growth and that process tends to slow down through time." i III.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
GAINS FROM TRADE
The badly ,kewed distribution of income, the dualistic character of much of the development that has taken place, and the slow speed of social progress are, of course, sources of widespread concern. In dealing with this area, Professor Griffin suggests that the benefits Ordinarily, one would suppose that trade itself is prima facie evidence that the inhabitants are better off, otherwise they wouldn't have made the exchange.
But here we are not treating a situation of smoothly functioning competitive markets, but one in which trade is imposed by a group of landlords on the inhabitants (defirsed as those people in the region outside the landlord class).
It is true, quite apart from the location of the banks, that the savings of the reqion would exceed investment in the region by the amount of the export surplus.
Therefore, if both export and impor-s were eliminated, investment would rise to stimulate growth.
But again we face the problems in the previous case of consumption:
to the extent that imports enter as inputs into local production their elimination would force a reduction in the region's output adverse.
affecting consumption,saving and investment.
Even if resources otherwise devoted to generating the export surplus could all be invested locally in the absence of trade, the elimination of cooperating inputb from the outside would reduce the marginal efficiency of investment and the marginal productivity of the existing capital stock. The net no-trade effect on growth, under these circumstances, could quite conceivably be negative.
Moving beyond these considerations we are left with the question whether reasonable assumptions could be set forth under which a region can be made absolutely worse off as a consequence of trade. One situation --also noted by Professor Griffin --relates to the loss a region can suffer as a consequence of the tendency for its skilled and ambitious workers to be drawn away by superior attractions offered elsewhere. Situations are easily imaginable in which peop.e remaining in a region are eado worse off as a consequence of a unilateral transfer of highly valued human resources out of the region. However, such a phenomenon cannot be attributed to the presen., of trade, per se, but rather it arises out of improved transportation, communication and education that, in general, serve to increase the mobility of resources. A second way in which these remaining inhabitants could conceivably oe better off without trade is that the landlords, who now "exploit" their workers, would find the region in the absence of trade much less economically attractive as a place to tie up their own assets.
As a consequence, they might be drawn away from the region 1 Here we presume a no-government aggregate model in which savings plus imports are equal to exports plus private investment. In the light of this discussion, I should like to go on Co prEsent some notions, having nothing directly to do with recorded levels of profits, that may explain why technical change has been slower in some countries than one might wish.
I would suggest that in the case of large landholdings with absentee ownership much of the problem arises from the disruptive effects that rapid technical change would have on the relations between the landowner and his subordinates (as well as with the rest of society) and the threat that technical cLange would pose to the landowner -18-and by giving the appearance of being an -issiduous worker, instill 'I in his relatively idle peer group feelings of guilt that would adversel3 affect his relations with them.
Thus, the difficulties of effectively delegating responsibility, the threat of technical change in terms of increasing the mobility of resources, and the disruptive effects on the landowners' social position may serve better to explain a low rate of technical change than does ýhe level of recorded profits ker se that landcwners now enjc
At the same time, we must recognize that some progress in agriculture is being made. In general, Latin America with all its problems has succeeded over the past decade or so in achieving an increase in productivity (measured as the ratio of output to farm population.) The dara available for several countries in Table 3 provide rather striking evidence of the gains that have taken place.
They offer little support to Professor Griffin's sweeping generalization that "the stagnant agricultural sector has been the principal factor restraining developnent." (p. 3)
IV. INGREDIENTS OF REFORM
PRESENT-DAY GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS
With particular reference to Chile and Peru, Professor Grlffin is critical of the bias of present-day governments toward urban consumption and investment, and their inability or unwillingness to push more quickly toward improving the lot of the rural masses. He sitn6ies out Chile's Frei Government for criticism on grounds that its "prorocicr popular" is chiefly concerned with "increasing welfare measures an consumption of the low income urban classes." (p. 17) It is distressing that he does not mention, even in passing, that in addition to "promocion popular," the Frei Government is also pushing hard to legislate an extensive land reform program under which large estates would be expropriated, the land subdivided, and provided on reasonable terms to the previously neglected rural poor. If the program is a success, it will contribute a good deal 1o improving the position of those who have been so neglected in the past. Similarly, he ci ticizes the Peruvian scheme of "cooperation popular" without Any government sensitive to the needs of the whole society will necessarily be involved in a delicate balancing act in which it will pursue programs in both rural and urban areas in an attempt to change the relationships of a number of groups with the rest of society. While it is easy to criticize any particular government for putting too much emphasis here and not enough there, one must keep in mind the central question as to whether the government is moving in the right, rather than the wrong, direction and at the same time recognize that given the many impediments to change, progress will very frequently be disappointingly slow.
1 Curiously, Professor Griffin criticizes Peru's "cooperation popular" also on grounds that "the emphasis ... has been on constructing provincial roads and schools. These are measures which increase labor mobility and skills, but they do not directly increase productivity." (p. 17) One wonders how Professor Griffin proposes to directly increase productivity without resort in one way or another to increasing labor mobility and skills.
2 Solon L. Barra-lough and Arthur L. Domike, "Evolution a'id Reform of Agrarian Struicture in Latin America," Instituto de Capacitacifn e Investigacin en Reforma Agraria, Santiago, Chile, p. 4 While, one might be less than optimistic about the prospects of success, given the enormous diffic:ulties Chile, Peru and other countries face, we cannot ignore present-day efforts of reform, and the growing general awareness of rural problems, in any sound assessment of government programs and policies. "The typically underdeveloped country does not face a ChOiLe of whether to employ labor in agriculture or industry. It usually has so much underemployed labor on the land that it can transfer labor resources to industry without much consequential reduction in agricultural output.
Insofar as the output of industrial p~roducts can be increased by an underdeveloped country without reducing the output of agriculture, this represents a net gain of real incorce to the economy.
And this is true no matter how inefficient the industrial production may te ... " (his italics)., Another possibility is to pursue labor-intensive agricultural projects perhaps along the lines of those advocated by Profes.sor Balogh.
He observes "it is civious that the only way in which the large mass of idle manpower caai effectively be used without F. It is difficult Lo imagine workers making much of a contribution to increasing agricultura productivity without tools to dig, cement, steel and timber for construction, and especially technical manpower for designing, organizing and guiding such projects through to a successful conclusion. While evidence is very sketchy and woefully incomplete, indications abound that China has had much difficulty precisely because she has not been able to cope with some of the problems listed above.
As Reubens has summarized:
"The regirne failed to distinguish real idleness from minimum necessar. leisure, failed Lo recognize various productive activities during the off-season; of field agriculture, :!nd failed to evaluate existing low-productivity operations by reference to the social need fcr their product and the jack of alternative sources of supply ... an economy likc China's does present a number of fields where incremental labor can operate productively with few comnlementary inputs of scarce materials and equipment, but the Communist regime overextended the allocations, sending recruited labor into fields of substantial costs in inputs, and also into fields where the marginal product of additional laboi was not merely nil but actually was negative, and into fields where a certain minimum of technical guidance proved to be indispensable.
Examining the results of irrigation projects in particulh", Wen-Shun Chi notes a number of examples in which China's experience was unfortunate. is taken into account, given the fact that both future costs and bene-1 fits; are frequently subject to wide ranges of error.
V. .ONCLUDYNG REIARKS
Despite Latin America's generally favorable natural resource endowment, ec..'omic and social progress remains frustratingly slow 4nd uneven, with large groups of the population continuing at bare subsistence.
Viewing the potential of the region, one has powerful incentive to seek explanatLons and to offer guidance for the future.
In this endeavor, it is all too easy to blame foreign investors and tle compositicn of trade for impoverishment, to castigate particular jovernments Efr rot doing enough, and to draw inappropriately from the experiences of other countries. The very complexity of the proceps of development combined with the urgency foe change frequently clouds real issues, highlights false ones and enlarges the scope for hasty recommendations ard calls to action which, if acted upon, would do great harm . Caution and care in analysis, not to be confused with lack of imagination and enthusiasm, are clearly essential in treading intellectual quicksand.
1A detailed cost/benefit analysis of four large agricultural projects in Peru illustrating these problems is contained in Delbert Fitchett, Investment Strategies in Peruvian Agriculture: Some Recent Experiences in Development Planning, RAMID RM-4791-AID, June 1966.
